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Environmental Liability Policies: The Extent Of Coverage

Written by Robert Emblem, Partner and Gabrielle Dumas-Aubin, Senior Associate, Clyde & Co

The authors wish to thank Raphaëlle Dussault for her contribution to the article

Soil contamination can expose landowners and businesses to significant liability. But Clyde & Co recently secured a Quebec ruling that demonstrates they should not assume that environmental liability insurance policies offer blanket protections against environmental risks. Indeed, there are significant differences between the types of coverage that they can offer.

In its judgment, in Paquet & Fils Ltée the Quebec Superior Court ruled on the applicability of an environmental cleanup and liability insurance policy for storage tanks. The defendants, a pool of insurers, issued the policy to the plaintiff, Paquet & Fils Ltée, a distributor of petroleum products, for its gas station located in Saint-Damien-de-Buckland, Quebec.

This lawsuit came about following the plaintiff’s discovery of contaminated soils at its gas station. The plaintiff had not conducted environmental testing when it acquired the site, nor when it dismantled the gas station.

It presented a claim to the Encon Group Inc. (which was acting as an insurance manager for the defendants) under the policy for the cost of decontamination. Encon denied coverage on the grounds that the plaintiff did not prove that the source of contamination originated from a storage tank leak during the period of insurance, as required under the policy.

The plaintiff sued the defendants contesting the denial of coverage, claiming that by taking such a position, the defendants never assumed any risk under the policy. It also argued that the defendants have been acting in bad faith when they initially issued the policy and following the receipt of its notice of claim. In particular, the plaintiff asserted that before issuing the policy, the defendants should have investigated the risk further instead of relying on the plaintiff’s statements. The plaintiff also argued that the defendants failed to advise it of the importance of identifying the source and age of the contamination. Finally, had it not been for the defendants’ late denial, the plaintiff claimed, it could have resumed its commercial activities at the site without having to decontaminate it.

Clyde & Co lawyers responded for the defendants that they were justified in denying coverage since the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, the existence of a “release,” within the meaning of the policy, during the period of insurance.

Initial comments

The court began by reviewing general interpretation principles for insurance policies. It explained that it was up to the insured first to establish that the claimed damage or loss falls within the initial grant of coverage. Following that, the insurer could prove that an exclusion applied. The court also noted that when the policy is unambiguous, it should give effect to clear language, reading the contract as a whole.

The court added that the insured could meet its onus by any means, including a presumption of fact, provided that it is serious, precise and concordant. That said, it notes that a presumption of fact cannot be deduced from a pure hypothesis, vague suspicions or mere conjecture. The court concluded that no presumption of fact was of assistance to the plaintiff in this case.

Policy triggers

The court explained that for coverage to be triggered under the policy, the plaintiff must prove, among other things, (1) the source of the contamination (i.e. a “release” originating from a “storage tank system”) and (2) the age of the contamination (i.e. started on or after the “retroactive date” specified in the policy).

It emphasized that the policy only covers a “release” originating from a “storage tank system” as opposed to one that occurs in the context of the plaintiff’s operations. Reviewing expert opinions and testimony, it indicated that it could not reasonably infer that a “release” had occurred. Even the plaintiff’s expert could not exclude that the plaintiff’s operations might have been the source of the contamination.

The court noted that no one had noticed or recorded a leak or any irregularity, which might suggest that a leak originated from a storage tank during the coverage period (on or after the “retroactive date”). In particular, it stressed that none of the experts could determine when precisely the contamination happened or how recently.

The court concluded that, in the absence of serious, precise and concordant facts proving that a release started during the period of coverage, the plaintiff could not demand that the defendants pay for the decontamination.

Illusory coverage and the insurers’ failure to investigate

The court also rejected the argument that the defendants never actually covered any risk. If, during the policy period, the plaintiff had observed a leak originating from its “storage tank system,” had conducted a proper investigation as required by the policy, and notified the defendants, there is no reason why coverage would have been denied.

The court also found that the defendants had no obligation to collect additional information to assess the risk at the time of the application for insurance. It made a distinction between the present matter and the case where the defendants would seek to cancel the policy for misrepresentation or non-disclosure of the material facts that affected their acceptance of the risk or setting the premium.

As for the allegations of bad faith, the court noted that the claims adjuster advised the plaintiff early on that, in the absence of an investigation establishing a “release,” coverage could be denied. The claims adjuster had also asked for additional information related to the source and age of the contamination. What’s more, the court concluded that the plaintiff did not demonstrate the seriousness of its alleged intention to resume its commercial activities. As a result, the defendants did not act in bad faith.

Takeaway

Ultimately, it is the insured’s responsibility to conduct environmental testing, in particular when acquiring a property, applying for an insurance policy or before dismantling facilities. These tests could be crucial to determine whether and to what extent coverage is available under an environmental liability policy. The plaintiff has not appealed the judgment.

This article has been republished with the permission of the authors.  It it was originally published on the Clyde & Co website.


About the Authors

Robert Emblem, Partner

Having worked on secondment with a leading Lloyd’s syndicate in the mid-1990s, Bob has also developed a large insurance coverage and defense practice. He represents insurers, reinsurers and insureds in the areas of commercial general liability, professional liability, media/technology liability, directors’ and officers’ liability, fidelity, contingency and property insurance. In addition to providing coverage and regulatory advice to insurers and reinsurers, he regularly performs policy wording reviews and claims audits.

Bob is a member of both the Ontario and Quebec bars, has wide-ranging experience in both the Common Law and civil law systems, and is fluently bilingual in English and French. Bob regularly appears before all levels of the Quebec courts as well as arbitration and mediation panels throughout North America.

Bob is one of the leading experts in Canada in the area of course of construction insurance and co-authored Commercial General Liability Insurance published by Butterworths. He speaks regularly at conferences and delivers papers for the Barreau du Québec, the Canadian Institute, the Canadian Bar Association, Insight, Canadian Defence Lawyers, the Insurance Bureau of Canada and other organizations.

Gabrielle Dumas-Aubin, Senior Associate

Gabrielle joined Clyde & Co in 2016, where she provides advices on managing and monitoring claims and insurance coverage for Canadian and foreign insurers. Gabrielle analyzes complex claims and draws up legal opinions on professional liability and general liability risks.

She graduated from the University of Ottawa with the honorary mention summa cum laude. During her studies, Gabrielle received numerous scholarships and was a research assistant for various professors. She completed her studies with a master’s degree in law at Oxford University in 2014.  Gabrielle is a member of the Young Bar Association of Montreal and of the Bar of Quebec in 2013.

Managing Environmental Risk through Brownfield Programs When Buying or Leasing Real Property in the United States

Written by Brooke F. Dickerson, Arnall Golden Gregory LLP

American environmental laws can be daunting for a foreign investor. For example, both federal and state laws can impose strict liability, which is liability regardless of fault or intent, on the owner or tenant of a contaminated property, which is sometimes called a “brownfield property.” Such liability could lead to the imposition of penalties, the obligation to perform cleanup work, the duty to reimburse another party for its damages, or the restriction of use of the property itself, even if the contamination occurred prior to the acquisition or lease of the property or if the contamination was not caused by the owner or tenant. There are certain compliances that need to be met if you’re a property owner of a normal building, let alone a contaminated property. Property managers need to make sure the building is compliant with regulations for that industry. They use software to keep track of the reporting and archiving of tasks, find out more about property compliance platform here if you’re interested. The owner/property manager needs to ensure contaminations are dealt with and compliant or will be penalized. However, there are various methods that an entity can use to limit or avoid such liability, as well as unexpected costs, time, expenses and possibly reverse phone lookup checks. A purchaser or incoming tenant of property that could be contaminated can protect itself by performing due diligence and availing itself of one or more of these methods.

One method frequently used to manage environmental liability is participation in a “Brownfield Program.” Brownfield programs provide liability protection and other benefits to a purchaser or new tenant of real property and have been adopted by several states. Generally, brownfield programs require that a party apply for acceptance either prior to or within a short time after acquiring a property interest. Both the property and the applicant must qualify under the particular criteria for that program. In the state of Georgia, for example: (1) the property must have a preexisting release of a hazardous substance but it cannot already be subject to cleanup requirements under other environmental laws; and (2) the applicant must not be a person who contributed to the contamination or have a close relationship with a person who contributed to the contamination, and the applicant must not be in violation of any environmental order or law. The applicant must agree to adequately assess the environmental conditions of the property, if not already done, and to address any releases that exceed regulatory clean up levels; the proposed assessment and remediation work are submitted in the application as part of a proposed corrective action plan. Finally, the applicant must certify to the agency that it has achieved its corrective action plan tasks after all the work is completed.

In return, an applicant will receive a “Limitation of Liability” under the brownfield law for all of the contaminants that it assessed and/or addressed. The limitation of liability is usually granted as soon as an application is approved, conditioned on the full performance of the corrective action plan. The limitation of liability becomes final upon approval of the applicant’s certification of compliance. The scope of a limitation of liability varies by state, but usually will include protection against any claim by the government for additional cleanup as well as by a third party, such as a neighboring property owner.

Participation in a brownfield program provides several other advantages as well. Remediation requirements can be reduced according to the specific intended use of the property and likely risks of exposure to human health or the environment. A residential use will require a more strict clean up than an industrial use; consequently, the cost to clean up property for an industrial plant will be much less than the costs to clean up property to be a housing development. A prospective purchaser or tenant will have a good estimate of how much it will have to spend and how much time it will take to address environmental problems before it acquires the property, enabling better budgeting and cost evaluation. A very important benefit is that the brownfield limitation of liability runs with the land, which means that the protections pass from the initial applicant to all subsequent owners and tenants of the property. Existing brownfield protection is a significant advantage when marketing the property if and when the owner wants to sell or re-lease it.

As with the extent of liability protection, other brownfield benefits can also vary state by state. Using the Georgia program as an example, a purchaser or new tenant in the brownfield program is excused from having to address any groundwater contamination (which is often the most costly type of remediation work), and the corrective action plan can be performed autonomously, only requiring governmental involvement when the entity submits its final certification of compliance with the corrective action plan. Not being required to obtain governmental approval at various milestones will save the owner or tenant significant time in completing the project.

Many states also offer tax benefits. The Georgia brownfield program incorporates property tax abatements up to the amount of eligible brownfield costs incurred. Eligible brownfield costs include almost all expenses related to assessing the property, working with consultants, cleaning up the property, preparing and submitting all required documentation and finalizing the limitation of liability; legal fees and true construction costs are not eligible. In essence, a new property owner or tenant can get reimbursed for all of its environmental costs through tax savings and still recoup the brownfield liability protection, limitation and certainty of expenses and time, and marketing benefits for resale.

In sum, a potential purchaser or tenant might want to give a contaminated property a second look. Such an investment may yield greater returns than locating on a clean property. So if you’re looking for new property to invest in, whether clean or contaminated, you may want to think about getting cash for your house in Seattle.

This article has been republished with the permission of the authors. It was first published on the AGG website.


About the Author

Brooke F. Dickerson focuses her practice on transaction, regulatory, compliance and permitting matters. With regards to environmental work, she has significant experience with Superfund (CERCLA), hazardous waste (RCRA and HWMA), the Georgia Hazardous Site Response Act (HSRA), solid waste, Brownfields, wetlands, and site evaluation, assessment and remediation issues. She also advises clients on stormwater compliance, green leasing issues and green/sustainable building practices. With regards to construction work, Ms. Dickerson advises owners and developers on the drafting and negotiation of architect, construction and construction management agreements. She has represented clients in connection with the construction of office, multi-family, mixed use and tenant improvement projects. She also advises clients on OSHA matters and has represented several companies in obtaining reduced or dismissed penalties in settlement negotiations.

Environmental Liability Risk Faced by Directors of Dissolved Companies – Getting around the Gehring Defence

Written by Una Rodaja, Harper Grey LLP

Once upon a time, you were a director of a company that owned a parcel of land in the Greater Vancouver area.  A dry-cleaner and an auto-repair shop operated on the property, but you were not too concerned about environmental liability.  This was the 80s after all and the rent was good!  Your tenants caused some environmental contamination, which you addressed when your company sold the site in 1990.  You dissolved your company a year later and forgot all about it.

The property is now owned by a developer who is seeking to build a residential tower on the property.  To do so, the developer is required to investigate and remediate contamination that remained on the property after your company sold it.  Standards have changed and the limited remediation your company did years ago no longer meets the applicable standards.  Your old tenants (both sole proprietorships) are long gone and the developer is seeking to hold you personally liable for the costs of remediation.  You did not personally operate on or own the property, so are you really at risk?  A recent BC Supreme Court case says you are.  Here we explain how and why.

Directors of existing corporations are “responsible persons”

Under BC’s Environmental Management Act[1], a director or officer of a company that owns or operates on, or has historically owned or operated on, a contaminated site is a “person responsible for remediation” of that site simply by virtue of their position with the company.[2]  Such directors and officers can be liable to pay reasonable costs of remediation incurred by anyone in respect of the site owned or operated on by their company, if they authorized, permitted or acquiesced to the activity that gave rise to the cost of remediation.[3]

Directors of dissolved corporations are not “responsible persons”

Although the language establishing the categories of “responsible persons” under BC law is very broad, it is not without limit.  For example, it does not include “persons” who have ceased to exist, such as dissolved corporations.  This was made clear by the BC Supreme Court in a seminal decision called Gehring[4].  The case has undoubtedly motivated many corporate dissolutions by directors and officers seeking to shield themselves from personal liability for contaminated sites owned or operated on by the companies they served.

Dissolved companies can be restored – then what?

However, in the recent decision of the BC Supreme Court in Foster v. Tundra Turbos Inc.[5], a director of a long-dissolved corporation that owned and operated on contaminated land faced exposure in an action to recover environmental remediation costs by virtue of an application to restore the company to the corporate registry.  The company in question, Tundra Turbos Inc., was incorporated in 1978, and was dissolved in 2000.  Prior to its dissolution, it had a single director, one Mr. Clarke. The Plaintiff sought to hold Mr. Clarke liable for the costs of remediation incurred in respect of the property, some 17 years after Tundra had dissolved.  The question before the court was whether it was appropriate to restore Tundra and reconstitute Mr. Clarke’s directorship to make it possible for Tundra and Mr. Clarke to be liable for the costs incurred by the Plaintiff in remediating the property owned by Tundra in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Tundra and Mr. Clarke presented several arguments against the restoration, including that Mr. Clarke would lose the Gehring defence, a substantive right, and that Tundra’s records pertaining to its operations at the property were destroyed, given the length of time involved.  The court rejected these arguments and ordered the restoration.

In the court’s view, there was nothing inherently unfair in the fact that companies and directors may be exposed to liability under BC’s environmental legislation many years after their association with a contaminated property ended.  Further, the right of a company and its directors to avoid liabilities for which they would have been exposed but for the dissolution is not the kind of right protected by legislation.  In fact, a legitimate purpose of restoring a company is to facilitate the imposition of such liabilities.  While destruction of the dissolved company’s records may, in certain circumstances, result in the court rejecting an application to restore, in Tundra’s case there was no prejudice arising from the loss of records because it was clear, on the facts, that had Tundra not been dissolved, it would have been responsible for the costs of remediation.  If anything, the lost records caused more prejudice to the Plaintiff than Tundra’s director, Mr. Clarke, who had personal knowledge of Tundra’s activities on the site.

In addition, the fact that Mr. Clarke could potentially face personal liability even without Tundra being restored (on the basis that he personally had the right to control, was in control of or responsible for any operation on the site in question) did not have a bearing on the restoration application.  The court recognized that it was easier to hold Mr. Clarke liable if he was responsible solely by virtue of his status as director, which could only be done if the company was restored.

Implications of the Tundra Decision

The Tundra case is an important example of creative counsel work to get around the Gehringdefence.  However, notwithstanding the outcome in that case, there are arguments to be made in future cases to avoid the restoration and, ultimately, responsible persons status for the director in question.  Existence of a limitation defence and loss of evidence that would assist in the defence of the director in question, or unreasonable delay of the Plaintiff in bringing the restoration application, may well result in the application being denied.

For lawyers advancing cost recovery claims, the Tundra case is a good reminder of the need to look at dissolved corporations and their directors and officers, and the need to apply for restoration, in a timely fashion.  For those defending these claims, and restoration applications, finding prejudice, beyond the mere loss of the Gehring defence, will be key.

[1] S.B.C. 2003, c. 53 (“EMA”)

[2] EMA, ss. 39(1), 45

[3] EMA, ss. 47(5); Contaminated Sites Regulation, s. 35(4)

[4] Gehring v. Chevron Canada Ltd., 2006 BCSC 1639, para. 55

[5] Foster v. Tundra Turbos Inc., 2018 BCSC 563

About the Author

Una Rodaja is a partner in Harper Grey’s Commercial Litigation and Environmental Regulation & Disputes practice groups. Una frequently lectures on various aspects of contaminated sites law for the Pacific Business and Law Institute, BC Environmental Industry Association, the Environmental Managers Association, and the BC Continuing Legal Education Society.  She is the co-author of BC Environmental Management Legislation and Commentaryand the recipient of the 2017 Lexpert® Leading Lawyers Under 40 award. Una is recognized by the 2018 Canadian Legal Lexpert® Directory as a Leading Lawyer to Watch in the area of corporate commercial litigation and by Benchmark Canada® as a Future Litigation Star. She has also been recognized by Best Lawyers® in Canada 2019 as a “Leading Lawyer in the area of Environmental Law.

United States: When Is Property Damage From A Release “Expected Or Intended”? Only After The Owner Learns Of The Spill And Ignores It

Written by Seth JaffeFoley Hoag LLP

Any good trial lawyer will tell you that the law is about telling stories.

Once upon a time, Timothy and Stacy Creamer bought a house.  Only after they closed did they realize that some strategically placed rugs were hiding the evidence that, “up from the ground come a bubblin’ crude.”

Unlike Jed Clampett, rather than finding themselves millionaires, the Creamers found themselves with a million dollar liability – literally.

This being a law story, of course the sellers were bankrupt.  The Creamers thus pursued the sellers’ insurer.  The case ended up in the Appeals Court, which held that the Creamers could pursue their claims under the policy.

The insurer, Arbella, made three arguments in support of its summary judgment motion.  The Court rejected them all.  In order, the Court held that:

  1. The property damage was caused by an occurrence.  Arbella argued that the damage was caused by the sellers’ fraud, not by the original release of oil.  However, as the Court pointed out, the Creamers’ had claims based on Chapter 21E, the Commonwealth’s superfund law.  Since Chapter 21E is a strict liability statute, the Creamers’ damages were caused by the release, not by the sellers’ fraud.  (But see number 3, below!)
  2. The loss occurred during the policy period.  Following precedent, the Court concluded that, so long as the property damage occurred during the policy period, it did not matter that the harm to the claimant did not occur until later.
  3. At least some of the damage was not “expected or intended.”  This is the most significant part of the case.  While preserving Creamers’ claims, the Court split the baby on this one.  It held that the original release was not expected or intended, but that, once the sellers discovered the spill without doing anything about it, any further damage was “expected” by the seller.  The Court thus remanded for a determination by the Superior Court how much of the total property damage was “expected.”

The Creamers will thus get their day in court, but, depending on when the sellers learned of the contamination, their recovery could be significantly limited.  They certainly will not get enough to move to Beverly Hills.  No swimming pools or movie stars for the Creamers.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

About the Author

Seth Jaffe is recognized by Chambers USA, The Best Lawyers in America and Massachusetts Super Lawyers as a leading practitioner in environmental compliance and related litigation. He is one of the authors of the Law and the Environment Blog, www.lawandenvironment.com, which provides real-world perspectives on current developments in environmental law and regulation. Seth is a past President of the American College of Environmental Lawyers.

Seth works on a wide range of environmental law issues, representing clients in the permitting/licensing of new facilities and offering ongoing guidance on permitting and enforcement related matters under federal and state Clean Air Acts, Clean Water Acts, RCRA, and TSCA. He also advises on wetlands and waterways regulation. Seth’s clients include electric generating facilities, companies in the printing and chemical industries, and education and health care institutions.

Vancouver files claim against owners of vessel that leaked fuel in 2015

As reported by CTV News, the City of Vancouver has filed a federal court claim against the owner of a vessel that spilled fuel into English Bay in 2015, as part of the city’s continuing effort to get compensation for its response efforts.

Vancouver Mayor Gregor Robertson says three years after the MV Marathassa spilled 2,700 litres of bunker fuel into the bay, the city still hasn’t been compensated for about $550,000 it spent on response efforts.

Robertson says Vancouver has sought repayment through the federal government’s Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund, but has only been promised compensation for 27 per cent of its costs — something Robertson called “totally unacceptable.

“It’s ridiculous that it’s taken over three years now fighting for our costs to be covered by an oil spill in our harbour,” Robertson told reporters gathered at Sunset Beach in Vancouver on Sunday.

The city’s claim against the ship owners — filed last month but announced on Sunday — calls for damages, interest and court costs related to the spill.

Robertson said the city’s difficulty in getting paid back for what he described as a “relatively small oil spill” shows there aren’t enough measures in place to protect coastal communities against more major spills.

He said the costs and impacts of a potential diluted bitumen spill from the increased tanker traffic that would come with the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain pipeline expansion has not been meaningfully addressed by the federal government.

Robertson said the Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund was set up by the federal government to act in the interest of communities like Vancouver, but is failing to do so.

“It clearly does not do that, does not deliver the results. This speaks to the greater concern we have with Kinder Morgan and oil tankers,” he said.

Transport Canada, which oversees spill response, could not immediately be reached for comment.

The claim’s statements have not been proven in court.

Crews on spill response boats work around the bulk carrier cargo ship Marathassa after a bunker fuel spill on Burrard Inlet in Vancouver, B.C., on Thursday April 9, 2015. (Darryl Dyck/THE CANADIAN PRESS)

Court Rejects Environmental Consultant’s Third Party Claim Against Prior Owner/Occupants

by Stan Berger, Fogler Rubinoff

On March 22, 2018 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in MVL Leasing Ltd. v CCI Group Inc. 2018 ONSC 1800 granted Rule 21 motions striking third party claims brought by an environmental consultant who was being sued by a purchaser of property for professional negligence and breach of contract. The lawsuit alleged that the plaintiff was led into closing the sale by the consultant’s Phase 1 and Phase 2 Environmental Site Assessments. The property turned out to be contaminated. The consultant in turn alleged that the contamination was caused by one or more businesses operated by the third parties. The consultant requested contribution indemnity from the third parties on 6 different grounds: nuisance, loss or damage caused by a spill pursuant to s.99 of Ontario’s Environmental Protection Act, the occupier’s duty under the Occupiers’ Liability Act to ensure the safety of persons entering upon the property, negligence, liability under the Negligence Act and unjust enrichment. The consultant argued that if found liable in the main action, it would have incurred pecuniary losses as a direct result of the spill, those damages being the plaintiff’s remediation costs and or the decrease in the property’s value.

Court’s Reasons for Rejecting the Third party Claims

The nuisance claim was rejected on the basis that the consultant did not own, occupy or possess the property, or any adjacent or nearby property impacted by the alleged contamination. The s.99 EPA claim was only available where the damages were directly caused by the spill and that was not the case. The occupier liability claim was rejected because the consultant suffered no damages as a result of entering the property in question. With respect to the negligence claim, the Court refused to impose a new duty of care upon the third parties. There was no proximity in the relationship between the consultant and the third parties. The potential economic harm to the consultant was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the alleged acts or omissions of the previous third party owners/occupiers. The Negligence Act claim was rejected on the basis that the consultant and the third parties did not meet the test under the Act of being concurrent tortfeasors for contribution and indemnity to be available. The plaintiff’s actual or potential causes of action against the consultant and the third parties were entirely different in nature. The damages allegedly caused by the third parties were different and discrete from those caused by the consultant. Finally, the unjust enrichment claim was rejected as the consultant had not pleaded any direct conferral of a benefit upon the third parties and the consultant had not suffered a corresponding detriment. If the consultant had incurred a detriment in the future by the plaintiff succeeding with its action, that detriment only related to the breach of contract and/or negligence of the consultant and the third parties were not parties to that relationship.

What can we take away from this Decision?

In order to sustain a third party claim against historic owners or occupiers of contaminated property, environmental consultants who are sued by a purchaser of contaminated property, will have to show that that the historic owners/occupiers were somehow responsible for or at least connected to the contractual breach or negligence which the purchaser alleges against the consultant.

This article was previously published by Fogler, Rubinoff LLP and can be found on the firm’s website.

About the Author

Stanley Berger is certified by the Law Society of Upper Canada as a specialist in Environmental Law.  He was called to the Ontario Bar in 1981.  He joined the law firm of Fogler Rubinoff in 2013.